MRAP V Superbomb: Round 2


cached/copied 03-05-10 - for original link click here
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2007/09/mrap-v-superbom/

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DANGER ROOM

Monday, September 03, 2007

MRAP V Superbomb: Round 2

By David Hambling

Danger Room - Wired Blogs: "The new Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles will not provide protection against explosively-formed projectiles (EFP), the roadside bombs that fire a high-velocity metal slug. So contractors are already working on MRAP II, which will provide a much higher level of protection against this sort of attack. But that doesn't necessarily mean it's 'game over' for EFPs."

Iraqi insurgents have shown themselves high adaptable. IED design has mutated rapidly, with a range of techniques being used to stay ahead of bomb jammers. If MRAP II is proof against existing EFPs, there are several routes the insurgents might take to upgrade their bombs.

1) Enhanced design. Basic EFPs form a dish-shaped liner into a crude metal slug. Sophisticated designs using supercomputer modelling can create a longer, more aerodynamic projectile with fins for greater range. Another alternative is a design which produces of a 'stretching rod' – the front is moving faster than the rear, so it stretches in flight. With a greater length-to-diameter ratio, these rods have shorter range but greater armor penetration.

Rating: Very unlikely without major outside assistance

2) Enhanced material. Existing EFPs are made of copper; US weapon designers also started with copper, but found that other, denser metals can produce improved performance. A common material for US weapons is the dense metal Tantalum, which will improve penetration by about 35% for the same diameter EFP.

Rating: Very unlikely. Tantulum is much harder to obtain and work than copper.

3) Enhanced targeting. All vehicles have specific weak points. For example, in Afghanistan Mujahideen learned to attack Soviet BMP armored vehicles from behind – the rear doors are hollow and contain fuel, so a hit on them can destroy the vehicle. Careful positioning of EFPs combined with more sophisticated triggering could take advantage of any vulnerability in MRAP II.

Rating: Possible, but difficult.

4) Bigger EFPs. Simply by making the EFP bigger its range and penetrating power can be increased. Existing insurgent weapons seem to have a diameter of around four inches and fire a slug weighing ounces. Larger EFPs can be fabricated; those pictured are made by Defence Industries of Iran and include one which fires a nine-pound slug capable of piercing fourteen inches of armor.

Rating: Likely. Fabricating and positioning larger EFPs is more challenging, but well within the capabilities of insurgents.

Such a move would then be a new challenge to the makers of amored vehicles - roll on MRAP III, or some EFP-defeating add-on. The arms race continues.

[bth: therea are two other ways (1) targeting two EFPs at the same point in space and (2) massively surging the number of EFPs from around 100-200 to 1000-2000 per month.]