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Planning the Peace and Enforcing the Surrender: Deterrence in the Allied Occupations of Germany

and Japan “A well behaved occupied country,” writes Schelling in *Arms and Influence*, “is not one in which violence plays no part; it may be one in which latent violence is used so skillfully that it need not be spent in punishment.” If violence does not ensue after a war, Schelling explains, it is because in the course of surrender negotiations, “the capacity to inflict pain and damage was successfully used in the bargaining process.” Schelling cites examples of Genghis Khan marching hostages ahead of his troops to deter resistance, the ancient Persians burning neighboring villages of clans that they sought to control, and the British conducting air raids in an attempt to pacify rebellious Arabian tribes. Bombings, hostage takings, publicized executions, forced evacuations, and compulsory labor are just a few among the many deterrent strategies that occupiers have used for centuries to prevent resistance and keep defeated populations quiescent.¹

Much in contrast to this traditional notion of ruthless conquest is the conventional wisdom surrounding the reasons for success in the post-World War II (wwII) occupations of Germany and Japan. The perception that these occupations were largely peaceful enterprises, with respect to both the policies used and the responses attained, supported early arguments from the administration of President George W. Bush that similar results could obtain in Iraq. Not only did discussions of Iraq frequently include parallels to the post-wwII cases, but also initial plans were to be based on policies used in Japan. Though critics disagreed that these poli-

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1 Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, 1966), 6, 12, 30.

cies could be applied to Iraq, few argued that the occupation strategy of the post-wwii era had been anything but benevolent.²

Recent attempts to draw lessons from the post-wwii occupations in light of the 2003 invasion have tended to credit a well-planned policy of benevolence and favorable conditions for success. Edelstein, for example, attributes success in Germany and Japan partly to the Allies' "credible guarantees of independent, indigenous rule," writing also that the favorable threat environment caused by the Cold War helped to engender cooperation. Dower also credits American reform efforts: "What made the occupation of Japan a success was two years or so of genuine reformist idealism." He adds that the occupation's legitimacy and its use of the Japanese bureaucracy, as well as the country's social cohesion, secure borders, and experience with democracy, helped to bring about peace. Similar arguments have been made about Germany. Maier, for example, points to the fear of Soviet rule, Germany's developed economy, the size of the defeat, and the absence of war profiteering as important factors.³

But although the conditions and benevolent policies in Ger-

2 After resistance developed in Iraq, administration officials drew parallels again to the wwii occupations, this time citing instances of sporadic resistance in Germany to argue that some violence was to be expected. Yet, officials never discussed how policies for Germany differed from those for Iraq. See Condoleezza Rice, "National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice Remarks to Veterans of Foreign Wars," 104th National Convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, Henry B. Gonzalez Convention Center, San Antonio, Texas (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/08/20030825-1>). For initial references to the post-wwii occupations, see President George W. Bush "Interview of the President by *Paris Match* Magazine," Rome, Italy, May 28, 2004 (<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/33149.htm>). For the borrowing of policies used in Japan, see David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, "Congress Authorizes Bush to Use Force Against Iraq, Creating a Broad Mandate; U.S. Has a Plan to Occupy Iraq, Officials Report," *New York Times*, 11 Oct. 2002. For critiques, see John W. Dower, "Lessons from Japan about War's Aftermath," *New York Times*, 27 Oct. 2002, C13; Wesley K. Clark, "Occupation: No Model for This One," *Washington Post*, 23 March 2003, B02.

3 David M. Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail," *International Security*, XXIX (2004), 65; *idem*, *Occupational Hazards: Success and Failure in Military Occupation* (Ithaca, 2008), 28, 128; John W. Dower, "A Warning from History: Don't Expect Democracy in Iraq," *Boston Review*, XXVII (2003) (<http://www.bostonreview.net/BR28.1/dower.html>); *idem* and Charles S. Maier, "Comparative Insights: Marshall Plan, Japan, and Iraq," March 7, 2005 (<http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/255/>). For more on past occupations, see Eva Bellin, "The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective," *Political Science Quarterly*, CXIX (2004), 595-609. Whereas these analyses explain success, the dependent variable in this study is U.S. occupation policy. Study of the latter, however, is essential to understanding the former and avoiding the potential for omitted variable bias.

many and Japan have been well documented, much less is known about the actual security measures planned and taken. Even studies that note the importance of security to the postwar peace have had little to say about how security measures actually worked. A prominent 2003 RAND study, for example, argues that the size of the occupation force used in Germany was critical to the occupation's success, but it fails to note how these forces were instructed to maintain order. This tendency to equate security with the occupying army's size has led to a vague understanding of how WWII occupation planners intended to establish security in the postwar world. Historical investigations of the occupations have been much more thorough in describing the initial punitive stance that occupation handbooks and manuals evinced. But even this literature makes scant mention of the specific rules of engagement. What exactly did the United States plan to do in the case of resistance? This study seeks to address the gap in both the historical and political-science literature by examining policy designed for the initial period of occupation in Germany and Japan.⁴

The extent to which occupation policy relied on the threat of violence is of fundamental importance to the larger question of why the post-WWII occupations were peaceful. This study's dependent variable is the degree of latent violence in postwar occupation policy, not the cause of success, because understanding how the peace was won requires understanding first how policymakers

4 James Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, 2003), xix. The vast historical literature addresses initial postwar attitudes and some coercive policies but generally fails to elaborate the policy regarding sanctions, reprisals, and postwar air power, or the study of Nazi counter-insurgency techniques described herein. An exception is Perry Biddiscombe, *Werewolf: The History of the National Socialist Guerrilla Movement, 1944–1946* (Toronto, 1998). For the Allies' punitive postwar approach, the most recent work is Giles MacDonogh, *After the Reich: From the Fall of Vienna to the Berlin Airlift* (London, 2007). Others include Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York, 2000); Eiji Takemae (trans. Robert Ricketts and Sebastian Swann), *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan and Its Legacy* (New York, 2002); Petra Goedde, *GIs and Germans: Culture, Gender and Foreign Relations, 1945–1949* (New Haven, 2003); Rebecca L. Boehling, *A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reforms and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany: Frankfurt, Munich, and Stuttgart under U.S. Occupation, 1945–1949* (Providence, 1996); Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York, 1985); Roger Buckley, *Occupation Diplomacy: Britain, the United States, and Japan, 1945–1952* (New York, 1982); Edward N. Peterson, *The American Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory* (Detroit, 1977). Postwar work that provides particularly good insight into the early policies of the occupation includes John Gimbel, *The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945–1949* (Stanford, 1968); Earl F. Ziemke, *The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 1944–1946* (Washington, D.C., 1975).

sought to win the peace. Recent accounts of the occupations tend to focus on policies and conditions that developed once the probability of postwar resistance was known to be low rather than on initial plans developed when the probability of resistance was believed to be high. Tension between the United States and the Soviet Union, the reconstruction of infrastructure, and substantial political reform, for example, did not develop until the occupation was well underway. The early phase, moreover, warrants special attention because successful threats have no need to be enacted. Because coercion is least likely to be observed when it is most successful, a lack of resistance may seem the product of conspicuous policies and conditions accompanying cooperation when the latent threat of violence may be driving results. But the mere use of coercion does not imply its success. Peace is no more deducible from coercive policies than it is from benevolent ones. Yet, the tendency to overlook the full range of policies risks the omission of potentially important factors; early U.S. occupation policy must be understood before conclusions about the elements of success can be drawn.

Expectations of postwar resistance and hostile public opinion encouraged a strategy of coercion that existed despite plans to democratize the defeated Axis nations. Unlike many previous studies, this one draws a distinction between the strategies developed prior to, and employed during, the early months of the occupations and those that came into play once occupation planners were more sanguine about the likelihood of peace. What matters, however, is not how long these early policies lasted but that they existed at all. They reveal what the Allies were prepared to do if the occupation met with violent resistance. The fact that they were in place for a relatively short time by no means indicates that the Allies intended to rely on noncoercive methods from the start.

FACTORS INFLUENCING POLICY Germany officially surrendered on May 8, 1945, but its occupation began as early as October 1944, when American forces seized the city of Aachen. Japan surrendered on August 15, 1945, but its occupation did not begin until U.S. forces had fully subdued the islands two weeks later. Before the occupations officially began, and for months thereafter, the likelihood that postwar bitterness would erupt in outright resistance to occupation remained largely unknown.

Government and military officials looking toward the postwar era had a strong suspicion that resistance would occur in both Germany and Japan. Rumors began circulating in summer 1944 that plans were underway in Germany to fortify a so-called National Redoubt, an alpine fortress in southern Bavaria where the party faithful would make their last stand. Though the Redoubt was largely a myth, reports of an underground network of Nazi fanatics, known as the Werewolves, fed fears of resistance during the first year of occupation. In the case of Japan, the suicidal fighting witnessed in Okinawa and Iwo Jima suggested that fierce opposition lay ahead if an invasion proved necessary. The 1.7 million ground troops in Japan and the additional 3.2 million civilian volunteer force that Japan had trained to defend the homeland at all costs provided ample reason for concern. Intelligence reports also warned that the military might order continued resistance throughout the empire.⁵

Expectations of postwar trouble were part of a more general hostile attitude shared by many Americans toward the defeated

5 Much of the primary source material cited in this paragraph, and this article, came from the Dwight D. Eisenhower (DDEI) and Harry S. Truman Presidential Libraries (HSTL) and The Hoover Institution, Stanford University (HISU). Where applicable, I have cited the more widely available format. For fears of resistance, see Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, R&A No. 1934, 1, "The Clandestine Nazi Movement in Postwar Germany," October 13, 1944, in *Germany and Its Occupied Territories during World War II* (Washington, D.C., 1977), 13, 17 (microform, iii, 2, Reel 14 [no. 2]); Allen W. Dulles (ed. Neal H. Petersen), *From Hitler's Doorstep: The Wartime Intelligence Reports of Allen Dulles, 1942-1945* (University Park, 1996), 387, 448; "Diary of Henry Lewis Stimson," July 2, 1945, in Makoto Iokibe (ed.), *The Occupation of Japan: U.S. Planning Documents, 1942-1945* (Bethesda, 1987), microform, Slide 5-D-1; "Blacklist Operations to Occupy Japan Proper and Korea after Surrender or Collapse," August 8, 1945, in *ibid.*, Slide 4-C-21; *Reports of General MacArthur: MacArthur in Japan: The Occupation: Military Phase, Volume 1 Supplement* (Washington, D.C., 1994), 4; Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, Report No. 2022, "Japanese Surrender—Postwar Resistance," in Paul Kesaris (ed.), *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part I: 1942-45: The Pacific Theater* (Frederick, 1981), microform, 1. For work on the redoubt, see Rodney Minott, *The Fortress that Never Was* (New York, 1964), 18; Joseph E. Persico, *Piercing the Reich: The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American Secret Agents during World War II* (New York, 1979), 10-11; Reuben E. Jenkins, "The Battle of the German National Redoubt—Planning Phase," *Military Review*, XXVI (1946), 3-8; Timothy Naftali, "Creating the Myth of the Alpenfestung: Allied Intelligence and the Collapse of the Nazi Police-State," in Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka (eds.), *Austrian Historical Memory & National Identity, Contemporary Austrian Studies* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1997), V, 203-246. Some believed as late as April 1945 that postwar resistance could last a full year. See Omar N. Bradley, *A Soldier's Story* (New York, 1951), 536; Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, 1948), 397; Minott, *Fortress*, 15; Harry Butcher, *My Three Years with Eisenhower* (New York, 1946), 815; Kenneth Strong, *Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of An Intelligence Officer* (Garden City, 1969), 256.

populations. Wartime mobilization efforts in both the Axis and Allied nations had been designed to incite fear and hatred of the enemy. As the war came to a close, these efforts, along with publicity of enemy atrocities, created an atmosphere in which security concerns dominated public discourse.⁶

These concerns had roots in events twenty-seven years earlier; many people viewed WWII as caused, in part, by the failure to enforce the surrender terms of WWI. Occupation manuals, published as late as 1946, informed new recruits about the so-called “Tragedy of Errors” committed in the wake of WWI. “Instead of saving the world for democracy,” one pamphlet explains, “we made so many mistakes that we ended up by rebuilding Germany for another war.” These sentiments mirrored public attitudes. A Gallup Poll of August 1944 reported that 73 percent of the U.S. population favored reducing Germany to a “third rate” nation after the war. In the week after Germany’s defeat, a National Opinion Research Center poll reported that 90 percent of the respondents wanted a peace settlement harsher than that offered by the Treaty of Versailles. Attitudes toward the Japanese were even more acrimonious. According to a 1944 Gallup poll, 13 percent of the respondents believed that the Japanese should be completely annihilated.⁷

Opinions among top government officials were divided, but key officials shared the punitive attitude of the public; President Franklin D. Roosevelt was particularly hostile to Germany. Criticizing a draft of the occupation handbook as too lenient, Roosevelt reportedly told Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, “We have to be tough with the German people, and I mean the German people not just the Nazis. We either have to castrate the Ger-

6 On mobilization efforts, see Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York, 1986). On the effects of wartime atrocities, see Theodore Cohen (ed. Herbert Passin), *Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal* (New York, 1987), 6–7.

7 On the WWI settlement, see U.S. Army Forces in the European Theater, *Occupation* (1946), 36. Propaganda films, such as *Your Job in Germany* (1945), also warned new occupation troops, “[J]ust as American soldiers had to do this job twenty-six years ago, so [others] might have to do it again.” See *Your Job in Germany*, created by the War Department: The Army Pictorial Service, Army Information Branch, Information and Education Division, available online at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum: [http://resources.ushmm.org/film/display/main.php?search=simple&dq=keyword\(HITLER+YOUTH\)&cache_file=uia_LgCHMS&total_recs=48&page_len=25&page=1&rec=24&file_num=159](http://resources.ushmm.org/film/display/main.php?search=simple&dq=keyword(HITLER+YOUTH)&cache_file=uia_LgCHMS&total_recs=48&page_len=25&page=1&rec=24&file_num=159). The Gallup and National Opinion Research Center polls are cited in John L. Snell, *Dilemma over Germany* (New Orleans, 1959), 9. The poll on Japan is cited in Meirion and Susie Harries, *Sheathing the Sword: The Demilitarisation of Japan* (London, 1987), 11; Schaller, *American Occupation of Japan*, 3.

man people or you have got to treat them in such a manner so they can't . . . continue the way they have in the past." For a short time, Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill supported Morgenthau's plan to pastoralize Germany. But not even staunch opponents to the plan within the government balked at the use of coercion. Secretary of War Henry Stimson complained that the plan promoted "the idea of vengeance instead of preventive punishment." Others argued that the destruction of resources would impact surrounding regions, as well as the U.S. economy.⁸

Although proponents of a hard peace held considerable sway regarding the treatment of Germany, such was not the case regarding the treatment of Japan until the final stages of the war. Initially, the State Department's "Japan Crowd," a group of scholars and diplomats with ties to the country, was able to push for agricultural, educational, and social reform, much of which survived the bureaucratic infighting. Their plans for economic reform, however, which would have revived Japan's economy, were shelved after James F. Byrnes was appointed secretary of state in July 1945. Byrnes, who favored a hard peace, sought to promote China at Japan's expense and pushed President Truman at Potsdam to reject making promises about keeping the emperor. Byrnes had the American public on his side. Given the "hang the emperor" attitude at the time, Stimson explained, the administration could not reverse its course: "Too many people were likely to cry shame."⁹

8 For attitudes toward the defeated, see Buckley, *Occupation Diplomacy*, 15; 204, n. 29; 31. Schaller, *American Occupation of Japan*, 3–4. Henry Morgenthau cites Franklin D. Roosevelt in Kesaris (ed.), *The Presidential Diaries of Henry Morgenthau, Jr. (1938–1945)* (Frederick, 1981), August 19, 1944, Book 6, Reel 2; Pogue, *Supreme Command*, 354. Ultimately, when critics charged that publicizing plans for a harsh peace would only prolong the war, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill distanced themselves from the plan. On their initial support, see John J. McCloy, "From Military to Self-Government," in Robert Wolfe (ed.), *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan* (Carbondale, 1984), 119. For an account of the Roosevelt cabinet's infighting about the Morgenthau Plan, see Michael Beschloss, *The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941–1945* (New York, 2002), 95–97, 196. See also, Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 104. On Roosevelt's reversal, see Alexander Feinberg, "Roosevelt Errors Prolong the War, Dewey Says Here," *New York Times*, 5 Nov. 1944, 1. Stimson's opposition is recounted in *idem* and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace & War* (New York, 1947), 581; Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 105; Peterson, *American Occupation of Germany*, 39. For fears on the economic impact of the plan, see Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 102–103. Buckley, *Occupation Diplomacy*, 14–17.

9 On the Japan Crowd, see Marlene Mayo, "American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan," in Wolfe (ed.), *Americans as Proconsuls*, 3–51, esp. 33. For more on early occupation planning for Japan, see Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 202–228; Eric H. F. Svensson, "The Military

By the end of the war, expectations of postwar resistance and attitudes toward the German and Japanese populations appeared to make coercion inevitable. The question was, How much coercion is necessary? Occupation policy, in addition to drawing from Nazi counterinsurgency methods, specified a series of sanctions and reprisals for battling rebellion, along with threats of aerial bombing to display the willingness of the United States to use violence in the postwar era. Because the Germans and Japanese largely cooperated, the force permitted in these prescriptions was rarely needed, but the threat of force was pervasive.¹⁰

POLICY AS PLANNED Military officials and planning staff did not initially envision an occupation strategy of deterrence, but by the time troops set foot on German soil, enforcement mechanisms drew clear inspiration from the principles of strategic violence. The handbook that Roosevelt had rejected was soon replaced by a more punitive version, the *Handbook for the Military Occupation of Germany*, which has been much discussed in the historical literature. Less frequently mentioned, however, are its accompaniments, the *Handbook for Unit Commanders* (HUC) and the study of Nazi counterinsurgency methods, “Combatting the Guerilla.” The HUC outlines sanctions and reprisals in a chapter entitled, “Measures for Protection of Allied Forces in their Relations with the Civil Population in Occupied Germany.”¹¹

The enforcement mechanisms for Japan initially derived from those for Germany. In the summer of 1945, Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s staff began work on operational plans in the event of Japan’s collapse or surrender. When the result, *Operation Blacklist*, was presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for review in early

Occupation of Japan: The First Years Planning, Policy Formulation, and Reforms,” unpub. Ph.D. diss. (Univ. of Denver, 1966). Stimson is quoted in *idem* and Bundy, *On Active Service*, 626.

10 According to Major General John H. Hildring, director of the division for initial occupation planning, “severe control” was mandated to protect against “sabotage and fifth-column activity” (Biddiscombe, *Werewolf*, 253).

11 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), *Handbook for Unit Commanders (Germany)*, rev. ed., February 15, 1945, 48–49. World Office, “Combatting the Guerilla,” May 1, 1945, General H. R. Bull’s Records (Asst. Chief of Staff G-3 SHAEF), WO 219/2921, National Archives (London). For more on Roosevelt’s criticism of the initial *Handbook for the Military Occupation of Germany*, see Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command* (Washington, D.C., 1996), 355.

August, it was not known how quickly Japan would surrender nor how quickly the United States would need to amass an occupying army. Noting the threat posed by “suicidal elements of the armed forces,” *Blacklist* outlined the same set of sanctions and reprisals as the HUC. Though many of the harshest measures were discarded after policymakers opted for an indirect occupation, certain methods, particularly sanctions, remained.¹²

Sanctions and Reprisals The HUC and *Blacklist* prescribed sanctions as the first resort in population control—compulsory labor, forced monetary contributions, and collective punishment, as well as less controversial restrictions on assembly, movement, and speech. Reprisals, unlike sanctions, were ostensibly reserved for active and organized resistance—“injurious and otherwise illegal acts,” justified when the enemy commits “illegal acts of warfare.”¹³

Reprisals permitted troops to destroy parts of, or entire, villages and towns that resisted. Aerial bombardment, artillery bombardment, demolitions, burning, or inundation by flooding were also admissible tactics against recalcitrant communities, although inhabitants were to be given a chance to seek shelter. Specifying the most effective use of bombardment, *Blacklist* recommended a “timely application” and “high-intensity” of attack, as well as a “disregard” for civilian property located near the military target. Reprisals could include the forced evacuation and destruction of land and resources to “cut off supplies of every nature” from insurgents. Districts and larger areas could be demolished to prevent their use as military bases, though provisions might be necessary to help the “peaceful population of the area” to survive. Reprisals, as such, could affect the broader population, even though they were meant to punish only insurgents. To be sure, both documents encouraged restraint, but, ultimately, reprisals were deemed appropriate “against anything and everything that belongs to, or is due to” the enemy state or its citizens.¹⁴

12 For the origins of *Blacklist*, see Mayo, “American Wartime Planning,” 49, n. 97. For predictions about resistance, see “Blacklist: Enforcement of Surrender Terms, Appendix 4, Annex 5b,” August 8, 1945, in Iokibe (ed.), *Occupation of Japan*, Slides 4-C-21, 2; Joint War Plans Committee, “Over-all Examination of Planning for the Occupation of Japan, Appendix C, Brief Plan of Blacklist,” August 3, 1945, in Kesaris (ed.), *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Pacific Theater*, Reel 5, 18.

13 SHAEF, *Handbook for Unit Commanders*, 49, 50; Iokibe (ed.), “Blacklist,” 2, 3.

14 SHAEF, *Handbook for Unit Commanders*, 50–52; Iokibe (ed.), “Blacklist,” 2–4.

Blacklist and the HUC also noted that the occupier retained the right of “seizing and retaining non-combatants as hostages,” to ensure protection of wounded soldiers, prisoners, and lines of communication. But hostage taking could also serve as a disarmament tool. Commanders could “force [hostages] to accompany military parties into buildings or areas which, after being cleared or inspected, [were] suspected of having been subsequently illegally mined or booby-trapped; or to compel them to ride on trains or other forms of transportation liable to be damaged by illegal acts of sabotage.” Hostage taking was portrayed as neither arbitrary nor vengeful. Hostages were to be “selected in an equitable manner and notification of such selection given to the community.” Notifications were to be accompanied by “an announcement of the proposed use of the hostages,” as well as a “statement that the consequences of any illegal acts [would] fall upon such hostages.” Interestingly, by publicizing the identity of hostages and their possible fate, these notifications, like ransom notes, strengthened the deterrent effect by making threats explicit. Neither of the official documents encouraged killing, but the warning in *Blacklist* that “the execution of hostages is not regarded with favor and requires the specific authority of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, in each case,” suggests that executions were not out of the question under certain circumstances.¹⁵

Though meant to be countermeasures against actual resistance, sanctions and reprisals were also approved in “the serious threat thereof.” Lest there be any doubt, “Combatting the Guerilla” emphasized the need for aggressive preemptive action. The study of Nazi counterinsurgency methods noted that the initial stage of occupation provided a crucial window of opportunity: “Ineffective or half-hearted measures in the early stages [would] tend to be the greatest incentive and encouragement not only to the guerillas, but also to all potential guerillas and active sympathizers.” Thus, “stern measures, such as curfew, prohibition of assembly, limitations of movement, heavy fines, forced labor, and the taking of hostages, [might have been considered] necessary in the face of a hostile population” even in the absence of overt guerilla warfare. The manual explained that “these measures [had to]

15 The passages about hostages come from Iokibe (ed.), “Blacklist,” 5.

be applied so as to induce the local inhabitants to work with the occupying forces.”¹⁶

Nowhere is the recommendation for selective violence more bluntly stated than in the lessons that the manual gleans from the Nazis’ “savage reprisals.” It explains that though selective violence largely failed in Russia, it was effective in Italy because of “the circumstances under which the countermeasures [were] taken; they are successful no matter how severe provided there is some relation between the punishment and the assistance rendered the guerrillas.” Failed deterrence, the manual therefore implied, comes from the indiscriminate application of violence, not the savageness of reprisals and certainly not the selective use of violence.¹⁷

The violence prescribed by the HUC, *Blacklist*, and “Combatting the Guerilla” was neither wanton nor arbitrary but strategic, meant primarily for the initial phase of occupation. The HUC thus described coercion as an unfortunate but vital part of the process: “As a matter of principle, reprisals between belligerents should not be necessary, but they cannot always be dispensed with, for the fear of their being used may constitute the most powerful deterrent.”¹⁸

Coercion from the Air The threat of punishment from the skies was considered an essential part of wartime strategy, as evidenced by the 300,000 German and 330,000 Japanese lives lost to bombing during the war. Air attacks were unrepentantly designed to coerce the civilian population. Yet, importantly, this strategy did not expire with the war; policymakers initially envisioned using air power to control occupied areas. Surprisingly, what eventually militated against this plan was not its severity but the fear that the deterrent threat would not be effective enough.¹⁹

16 The HUC called for “prompt and aggressive” action (SHAEF, *Handbook for Unit Commanders*, 48, 49). World Office, “Combatting the Guerrilla,” 5, 36.

17 World Office, “Combatting the Guerrilla,” 5, 8, 25.

18 SHAEF, *Handbook for Unit Commanders*, 50.

19 Deaths from air power are from Kenneth P. Werrell, *Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers over Japan during World War II* (Washington, D.C., 1996), 32, 227. Werrell notes that the figure for Germany may be as high as 600,000, whereas Japanese reports give the number of Japanese killed as 241,000. For more on American wartime air strategy, see also Tami Davis Biddle, *Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945* (Princeton, 2002), 245.

The use of air raids to encourage submission had the advantage of sparing the expense of a large occupying army. A champion of the approach was Lord Charles Portal, British Chief of Air Staff, who had relied on it in his capacity as Air Commodore for the British Protectorate of Aden. In his view, “the air blockade that has brought [a rebel] to heel once can be put on again,” and “what has been done to one tribe can easily be done to any others.” Decades later, in mid-1943, Portal reported to Churchill that “the idea is gaining ground in the Chiefs of Staff Committee that we shall not occupy Germany with large land forces but that the air weapon, in conjunction with small mobile land forces, will be used to back up the control exercised by a relatively small supervisory organisation.”²⁰

Despite air power’s cost-saving appeal, the British lost interest in it because they had misgivings about its deterrent strength. Nothing could replace the show of force from boots on the ground. By May 1944, the British Chiefs of Staff, responding to an American proposal for “overwhelming air power” and highly mobile land forces, stated, “The United States Chiefs of Staff underestimate the forces which will be required to ensure adherence to the surrender terms and to obtain firm control of Germany. The Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force, in his planning, has given the fullest consideration to the use of air power but in view of the chaotic conditions likely to follow the collapse of Germany he considers it essential that land forces be speedily established in the main centres of transportation and civilian and military administration in order to ensure firm control.” Fears that air power alone would be inadequate, however, did not translate into lost confidence in air power altogether. The British delegation to the European Advisory Commission maintained that “a strong air striking force [would be] be essential at all stages.”²¹

20 According to one U.S. report, air power was “a means of enforcing the surrender terms with the maximum economy of U.S. manpower.” See Headquarters, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, “Occupation Period Requirements of U.S. Air Forces in Europe,” March 15, 1945, The Papers of Frederick Anderson, Box 83–9, Tab H, 3, HISU, Palo Alto. For Portal’s comments see Allan A. Michie, *Keeping the Peace through Air Power* (New York, 1944), 157; Portal to Churchill, July 24, 1943, in *Churchill at War: The Prime Minister’s Office Papers, 1940–1945* (Woodbridge, Conn., 1998), PREM 3, Reel 4.

21 Combined Chiefs of Staff, “Rankin C: Shipping Requirements, Memorandum by the Representatives of British Chiefs of Staff,” May 6, 1944, in Kesaris (ed.), *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Reel 7.

By 1945, Washington had come to agree with London about the mistake of relying exclusively on air power, but the belief that air power could provide a powerful psychological deterrent nonetheless remained. An April 1945 report by the Office of the Commanding General, U.S Strategic Air Forces in Europe, argued that the threat of bombing should play an important role in the post-war era. Approved by President Eisenhower and the JCS, the report recommended strategic air bases in Europe to impress upon the Germans the Allied commitment to enforcement: "Through the years of war, the power of Allied strategic air bombardment has been a symbol to the German people of overwhelming Allied might. The continuing threat of this special form of attack against Germany will be a weighty reminder to the German people of the dangers of any effort to thwart the strict enforcement of the terms of surrender." The same memo estimated that an "Occupation Air Force" would require thirty-three bases, comprised, in part, of thirteen heavy and medium bomber groups and ten fighter groups; it suggested another nine bases in France, Italy, Denmark, and Norway. Their purpose was to "make possible the posing of the necessary local air threat."²²

Initial postwar plans for Japan mirrored these ideas. After the surrender ceremonies, major cities and critical areas were to be patrolled by air until an "Occupation Air Force" could be established. For this task, two B-25 groups and three "Very Long Range" fighter groups based in the southern islands would monitor the southern half of Japan, while two groups of B-29s based on Iwo Jima would patrol the northern half. Once occupation forces were in place, air squadrons would be based in Japan proper. A plan issued in June 1945 estimated the number of airborne units to be roughly 125,000 men from the Army Air Force and another 215,000 from Marine air squadrons to comprise close to 40 percent of the proposed total of 863,700 forces.²³

In the end, these visions of air power would be downsized in both Europe and Asia as the magnitude of the Axis defeat

22 Headquarters, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, Office of the Commanding General, APO 633, "Occupation Period Requirements of U.S. Air Forces in Europe," April 10, 1945; "Occupation Period Requirements of U.S. Air Forces in Europe," March 15, 1945, The Papers of Frederick Anderson, Box 83-9, Tab I; Tab C Enclosure 1, HISU.

23 Joint War Programs Committee 264/2, "Estimate of U.S. Forces Required for the Occupation of Strategic Positions in Japan Proper in the Event of a Sudden Collapse or Surrender," June 8, 1945, in Kesaris (ed.), *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Reel 5, 9.

became evident. Air power's fate, however, does not lessen the significance of its initial appeal. What deterred the Anglo-American allies from using air power to police Germany and Japan was not moral discomfort but the concern that its threat quotient could not match that of a large occupying army.

IMPLEMENTING POLICY The planning phases of occupation policy employed the unmistakable elements of deterrence, but to what extent was the threat of force actually communicated? Deterrent policies in Germany remained in effect until and, in some respects, throughout the first year of occupation. In Japan, however, the shortage of U.S. troops available to occupy the main islands and the belief that retaining the emperor was key to controlling the population prompted a shift toward indirect occupation. Yet, promises to keep the emperor were left deliberately vague, and announcements of the change in policy were withheld until American forces fully occupied the mainland. Meanwhile, policies to demonstrate force through air power remained. As contact with the occupied populations progressed and attitudes softened, policies became more overtly benevolent.

Germany The parts of Germany that were occupied eight months prior to the country's final defeat experienced the full extent of coercion outlined in U.S. policy. Continued fears of resistance after Germany's defeat ensured the continuation of this program for a while longer. By the summer of 1945, concerns had turned toward the economy, partly because officials predicted that discontent would increase among the population when winter exacerbated their deprivation. Major humanitarian aid efforts ensued. Fears of overt resistance would last until 1946, though the prospect of subversive resistance kept occupation officials vigilant for several years.

Allied troops occupying German soil in September 1944 implemented the sanctions and reprisals listed in the HUC to deal with ongoing hostilities; civilians failing to comply risked death. Some reprisals appear to have been in response to Nazi atrocities. Friedrich, an early chronicler of the occupation, reported that the town of Bruchsal was completely destroyed, but, in general, the purpose of the reprisals was to forestall resistance. Violations of the strict curfew brought imprisonment or death. In March 1945, a German civilian was shot dead for such a violation in the Rhine-

land. A month later, the First U.S. Army responded to civilian snipers by devastating a village with heavy tank fire, leaving it in ruins. Other cities that resisted met similar fates. One officer from the U.S. Third Army explained his orders as “to burn any house which harbours an S.S. man.” The goal was clear: “The sooner civilians get to know this, the quicker they will stop giving cover to these dangerous pests.” The willingness to use force was not hidden. In late April, Churchill publicly announced plans to intern German commissioned and noncommissioned officers while guerrilla warfare lasted, effectively keeping them as hostages.²⁴

Despite the surrender, several of the enforcement measures outlined in the HUC remained in effect. The military conducted massive sweeps of the American Zone throughout the first year in search of security violations, illegal possession of firearms, and individuals suspected of organized resistance. In July 1945, a surprise raid resulted in the arrest of 83,000 people, and a November raid netted an additional 3,000. For those found guilty of unlawfully possessing weapons, the maximum penalty was death. Dozens of executions, primarily of alleged wartime spies, took place—in the U.S. zone by firing squad and in the British zone by beheading. Many of these executions served as public warnings. In June 1945, two German boys, aged sixteen and seventeen, were sentenced to death for reporting U.S. troop movements. The statement delivered to the defendants by the court president made the deterrent purpose of the verdict clear: “You will pay the supreme penalty for your offences so that the German people will know that we intend to use whatever force is necessary to eradicate completely the blight of German militarism and Nazi ideology from the face of the earth.” The newsreels that accompanied the first theatrical

24 For Bruchsal, see Carl J. Friedrich, *American Experiences in Military Government in World War II* (New York, 1948), 241. For punishments and reprisals, see “Sentry Shoots German Civilian,” *Manchester Guardian*, 17 March 1945; “Nazis Race For Hills as Patton Perils Escape Path,” *Washington Post*, 14 April 1945, 1; Ziemke, quoting the report of two captains, notes that Lippe and Paderborn were also destroyed because of resistance (*U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 226); “New S.S. Tactics,” *Manchester Guardian*, 3 April 1945. For Churchill’s plan, see “Face Long Imprisonment: Many Germans to Be Held as Long as Guerillas Fight On,” *New York Times*, 25 April 1945, 4. British and American forces found themselves with 5 million enemy forces at the end of the war. Kept in open-air enclosures, the majority of prisoners were released by August 1945, but by April 1946, 50,000 POWs still remained in U.S. custody. Dana A. Schmidt, “Underground Raid Holds 183 Germans,” *New York Times*, 2 April 1946, 12; Bischof and Stephen Ambrose, *Eisenhower and the German POWs, Facts against Falsehood* (Baton Rouge, 1992), 5.

films shown in Munich displayed such executions. One audience member recalled, “Every detail of the shooting was shown—binding of the Germans to the pole, the firing squad shots and the collapse of the spies. As only one or two were shot at a time, this performance was repeated four times and one felt the collapse of the people in the audience when the spies fell down.”²⁵

Less drastic measures were employed throughout the occupation. The summer of 1945 saw the first collective fine imposed on a town; fines, bans on movement, and curfews as retaliatory measures remained for years into the occupation. In fact, the occupiers made more than 4,000 arrests for curfew and travel violations in April 1946 alone. Restrictions on the right of assembly persisted until the early autumn of 1945. Not until November 1946 were soldiers ordered to cease using weapons against minor offenders. The ban followed the shooting of a sixty-five-year-old German civilian who failed to stop his bicycle when commanded.²⁶

Efforts to enforce the surrender were beginning to relax by the summer of 1945, when the extent of Germany’s weakness had become clear. By late June, however, military-government officials suspected that tens of thousands of German soldiers had stashed away their firearms at the end of the war. As one officer remarked, “If they are hungry this winter they will dig up the guns

25 In 1946, the United States held 88,000 civilians in internment camps (Schmidt, “Underground Raid Holds 183 Germans,” *New York Times*, 2 April 1946, 12). In July, 77,000 of the 83,000 total were arrested for identification violations and released. The raid was still regarded as a success for showing the “serious intention of the American troops” to the population. Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 319. For punishments, see “3,000 Germans Held After Mass Raids,” *New York Times*, 24 Nov. 1945; “U.S. Troops Clean Up Zone of Germany by New Raids,” *ibid.*, 19 Nov. 1945; “German Who Carried Arms Shot,” *ibid.*, 19 June 1945, 9; “2 Germans Executed for Having Firearms,” *ibid.*, 25 June 1945, 2; “British Sentence Twelve Germans to Die,” *ibid.*, 18 May 1945, 6; “30 Germans Held,” *ibid.*, 1 July 1945, 6; “Three Germans Executed. Soldiers Are Decapitated for Hiding Pistols after Truce,” *ibid.*, 11 June 1945, 3; “Spy Executions Total 31. U.S.,” *ibid.*, 8 July 1945, 13. These and additional reports of executions and reprisals are also cited in Biddiscombe, *The Last Nazis: SS Werewolf Guerrilla Resistance in Europe, 1944–1947* (Stroud, England, 2000), 167–176; *idem*, *Werewolf*, 252–274. The sentencing for the Hitler Youth is cited in “2 Hitler Youths Executed,” *Manchester Guardian*, 5 June 1945; “2 Hitler Youths Shot by Allies as Spies,” *New York Times*, 5 June 1945, 12; “German Spies Are Executed by the Americans,” *ibid.*, 30 May 1945, 9. The public executions are described in Julian Bach, Jr., *America’s Germany: An Account of the Occupation* (New York, 1946), 232–233.

26 For collective fines, arrests for travel restrictions, and political activity bans, see Biddiscombe, *Werewolf*, 256, 265; Military Government of Germany, “Denazification and Public Safety, Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone,” June 20, 1946, No. 11, 11. For the eventual ban on using weapons in cases of minor offensives, see “U.S. Army Restricts Use of Firearms in Germany,” *New York Times*, 20 Nov. 1946, 15.

and start shooting.” These concerns prompted efforts to address Germany’s critical food shortage—all the while, security remaining a top priority. In October, all military–government detachments were ordered to advise German officials that any disorder would be countered with collective punishment.²⁷

Ultimately, the occupation’s turn toward a less punitive approach was gradual, much like the fading out of the non-fraternization policies. Issued in 1944, these policies had prohibited all social contact with German civilians. By June 1945, the ban on contact with small children had been lifted, and by September, soldiers were permitted to speak with civilians, though policy encouraged limited contact. By September 1946, the reversal in policy was evident; one occupation bulletin declared, “[T]he general salvaging of the German population is now the order of the day. . . . Every element of the occupation forces is involved in this program.” By mid-1946 open resistance was widely regarded as, in the words of one *New York Times* correspondent, “senseless and without prospect.” Nevertheless, fears of subversive resistance remained. Concern that Nazi sympathizers would infiltrate legitimate political parties and revive German nationalism prompted a denazification program in the U.S. zone that was more thorough than that in any other part of Germany.²⁸

Japan Although the early occupation policies in Japan were based on those for Germany, within weeks of the surrender they

27 For fears of the winter, see “Allies Fear Riots if Reich is Hungry,” *New York Times*, 26 June 1945, 5; Military Government of Germany, “Public Safety Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone,” August 20, 1945, no. 1, 2; for efforts to provide relief, Gimbel, *American Occupation of Germany*, 11–14; for punishments of disorder, Ziemke, “Improvising in Postwar Germany,” in Wolfe (ed.), *Americans as Proconsuls*, 65. The dire predictions for the winter did not hold true (Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 407–413).

28 In practice, the non-fraternization policy was widely violated, but its existence reflects official attitude. Policies and quoted bulletin are from Peterson, *American Occupation of Germany*, 155. For fears of open resistance that lingered into the second year of occupation, see Sydney Gruson, “Night Raids Staged,” *New York Times*, 31 March 1946, 1; Schmidt, “Underground Raid Holds 183 Germans,” *ibid.*, 2 April 1946, 12. Quotation on resistance is from Schmidt, “German Resistance Threat has Failed to Materialize,” *New York Times*, 27 Oct. 1946, 99. For denazification, see Byron Price, “Memorandum to the President,” November 9, 1945, United States Policy in Occupied Germany After World War II, Student Research File, Box 1, Folder 1: Document No. 1–17, 10, HSTL, Independence, Mo.; for the significance of the Price Report, Gimbel, *American Occupation of Germany*, 21–23. Each of the four zones implemented its own denazification program, but only the U.S. zone restricted both active and nominal Nazi Party members from all work but “ordinary labor.” Arsen L. Yakoubian, “Western Allied Occupation Policies and Development of German Democracy, 1945–1951,” unpub. Ph.D. diss. (New York Univ., 1951), 69–91; Elmer Plischke, “Denazification in Germany: A Policy Analysis,” in Wolfe (ed.), *Americans as Proconsuls*, 219.

had mutated. The troop numbers and skills needed for another direct occupation were in short supply, necessitating an indirect occupation and the revision of coercive policies. But despite orders for the new approach, MacArthur withheld announcement of the change until U.S. forces had covered the island. Meanwhile, low-level flights were maintained to intimidate the population. In the first weeks, the aim was to focus on demonstrating the will to use force.

With a direct occupation already underway in Germany, public pressure mounting to bring the troops home, and a shortage of skilled personnel that could effectively govern Japan, another direct occupation did not appear viable. From August 14 to 22, John J. McCloy, Stimson's assistant secretary, along with advisors from the war and state departments, feverishly revised occupation plans. The supreme commander would "exercise his authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies, including the Emperor."²⁹

While McCloy's team was at work, however, the pre-existing policy, with its emphasis on coercion, particularly via air power, remained in effect. Though Japan had surrendered, a steady stream of B-29s filled the skies for two weeks. In the words of a directive from the Air Staff U.S. Army Air Force (AAF) Headquarters on August 10, the purpose of this spectacle was to demonstrate U.S. power: "A major mission of the AAF is a display of force for the continued intimidation of the Japanese during the interim from their capitulation until the actual arrival of the occupation forces." This display of force is noted by the empress in an August 30 letter to her son, in which she wrote, "Every day from morning to night B-29s, naval bombers, and fighters freely fly over the palace in all directions, making an enormous noise. . . . Unfortunately, the B-29 is a splendid [plane]."³⁰

MacArthur received word of the new policy on August 23,

29 On the shortage of skilled personnel, see Hugh Borton, "United States Occupation Policies in Japan Since Surrender," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXII (1947), 253; *Reports of General MacArthur*, 2. Even prior to surrender, many supported keeping the emperor in place to elicit cooperation, but promises were withheld. See Stimson, August 10, 1945, in Iokibe (ed.), *Occupation of Japan*, Slide 5-D-1; *Reports of General MacArthur*, 2.; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 282–283; Mayo, "American Wartime Planning," 471–472. On the surrender and the change in policy, see Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 5; McCloy's directions to MacArthur are cited in Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 226.

30 "Air Plan to Aid and to Accelerate the Establishment of Occupational Forces in Japan in

days before the first advance party was to arrive in Japan. The orders caused an immediate revision of the coercive policies in *Blacklist*, but they did not alter the belief in the need for shows of force. Admiral Robert Carney warned his troops before reaching Japan, “It must be remembered that these are the same Japanese whose treachery, cruelty, and subtlety brought about this war; we must be continually vigilant for overt treachery.” As an American task force dropped anchor in Tokyo Bay on August 28, carrier planes flew overhead in a show of force “to discourage any treachery on the part of the enemy.”³¹

As his orders permitted, MacArthur instituted direct military rule and martial law to enforce the surrender. Japanese officials, upon realizing that his proclamations would expropriate the government’s powers, sent Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru to meet MacArthur on September 3. Shigemitsu argued, “If the Allied Powers wish to see Potsdam operating properly, they cannot do better than to carry out their plans through the agency of the Japanese government.” With U.S. forces already stretching out across Japan and disarmament underway, MacArthur rescinded the proclamations.³²

Instances of resistance in Japan, as well as of outright American reprisal, may have been rare, but shows of force to ensure and enforce the defeat were much in evidence—the 462 B-29s that swooped over Tokyo Bay during the surrender ceremonies being a case in point. But such shows of force soon gave way to carrots

the Event of a Sudden Surrender or Collapse, Appendix B,” August 10, 1945, in Kesaris (ed.), *Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, Reel 5, 30. The empress is cited in Herbert Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan* (New York, 2000), 533.

31 As Brigadier General Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur’s Chief of Intelligence, explained, the shortage of troops meant that “punitive or disciplinary features are impracticable now and may become fatal, if initiated prematurely” (Mayo, “American Wartime Planning,” 471). Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 61. Carney is cited in Charles R. Smith, *Securing the Surrender: Marines in the Occupation of Japan* (Washington, D.C., 1997), 8–9. For the importance of demonstrating force with air power, see *ibid.*, 9. *Reports of General MacArthur*, 17, 24–25. Commanders soon realized that resistance was unlikely (Smith, *Securing the Surrender*, 9, 14).

32 Violations of the surrender terms, disruptions of the peace, or actions endangering the life, safety, or property of the Allied Forces were to be punishable by death (Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 61–62). Mamoru Shigemitsu, *Japan and Her Destiny, My Struggle for Peace* (New York, 1958), 376; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 61–63. Although the proclamations about direct military rule shocked Japanese officials, the fact that occupying forces provided their own food and did not confiscate civilian property indicated a far more benevolent policy than the Japanese had been warned to expect (*Reports of General MacArthur*, 23–24).

on a stick—the retention of the emperor and indirect occupation.³³

Applying both Carrots and Sticks The mission to enforce the surrender was not the only goal in the aftermath of WWII. The plan to rebuild Germany and Japan as democracies is well known, as is the humanitarian aid and reconstruction that the victors eventually provided. Edelstein views these policies in the case of Japan as evidence of inducement and accommodation, not of coercion. But despite the recourse to economic and political incentives, sometimes even early during the occupation, the prohibition on reconstruction at the outset actually stalled much humanitarian aid. Meanwhile, early liberal reforms had little appeal to those whom the United States feared might resist—conservatives and the military—and the intention to retain the emperor was never explicit. Ultimately, in both countries, during the early stages of the occupation, positive inducements were delayed, vague, and/or inconsistent.³⁴

In Germany, not until the spring of 1946 did Military Governor Lucius Clay prematurely bring an end to reparation shipments to the Soviets, a major reversal of the policies that prohibited reconstruction. Delays, even of humanitarian aid, had serious economic effects. Nine months into the occupation, MacArthur declared Japan “a vast concentration camp under the control of the Allies.” Political freedoms, which remained privileges rather than rights, were sometimes withheld for security’s sake. In Japan, despite the freedoms of assembly, speech, and worship, and a democratic constitution, censorship remained pervasive, stifling criticism of the occupation. Notwithstanding vague assurances to the contrary, the possibility of trying the emperor as a war criminal re-

33 Curtis E. LeMay (with MacKinley Kantor), *Mission with LeMay: My Story* (Garden City, N.Y., 1965), 390.

34 Edelstein, *Occupational Hazards*, 128–129. Initial policy for Germany, outlined in JCS 1067, warned occupation forces to take no steps “looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany.” United States Department of State, *The Axis in Defeat: A Collection of Documents on American Policy toward Germany and Japan* (Washington, D.C., 1945), 49, 112. The Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, publicly released on September 22, 1945, explicitly stated, “The plight of Japan is the direct outcome of its own behavior, and the Allies will not undertake the burden of repairing the damage” (112). Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 27–31. In practice, Military Governors Lucius Clay in Germany and MacArthur in Japan sought to work around these economic restrictions. Nevertheless, policies on demilitarization, destruction of war-making industries, and import restrictions were initiated in the first year of occupation with lasting effects.

mained on the table until 1946. In Germany, as late as November 1948, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) reported overly rigid censorship controls. Political purges were common in both countries during the early stages. Fears that Nazi supporters might filter into positions of power resulted in mass arrests—100,000 by the end of 1945, not counting the POWs already imprisoned. The arrest rate reached 700 per day in July; habeas corpus was suspended and not reinstated until 1948.³⁵

Though many controls would loosen during the first year of occupation, policies designed to punish the Axis nations, such as labor reparations, would remain for years. The U.S. initially declared itself uninterested in POW labor, but by late September 1945, 350,000 German POWs were in labor service units. By the end of 1946, American use of German labor had ceased, but in March 1947, the British still held more than 400,000 POWs outside Germany, the French more than 600,000, and the Soviets an estimated 3 million. In the Pacific, the United States kept 70,000 POWs for more than a year to demilitarize areas outside Japan, and the British found work for 113,500 POWs until 1947. The Chinese retained approximately 68,000 POWs and the Soviets from 1.6 to 1.7 million of them.³⁶

35 For attempts to override the economic restrictions, see Eleanor M. Hadley, “From Decentralization to Reverse Course in Japan”; John H. Backer, “From Morgenthau Plan to Marshall Plan”; and the “Discussion” that follows in Wolfe (ed.), *Americans as Proconsuls*, 155–165; Gimbel, *American Occupation of Germany*, 5–16. MacArthur is cited in Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 78. In the first month, censorship was minimal until negative reports appeared in the press (Mayo, “American Wartime Planning,” 296–297, 309). On trying the emperor, see Harries, *Sheathing the Sword*, 131; for more on political restrictions and the ACLU report, Peterson, *American Occupation of Germany*, 157; Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, 144; for numbers arrested, Peterson, *American Occupation of Germany*, 145; for suspension of habeas corpus, Military Government of Germany, “Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone, No. 3 (October 1945), 2. Dulles, “That Was Then: Allen W. Dulles on the Occupation of Germany, *Foreign Affairs*, LXXXII (2003) (<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20031101afacomment82601-p0/allen-w-dulles/that-was-then-allen-w-dulles-on-the-occupation-of-germany.html>, 2); Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, 1950), 249. In Germany, 418,307 were banned from office, in Japan, 200,000. Richard B. Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan* (Berkeley, 1992), 83; Hans H. Baerwald, “The Purge in Occupied Japan,” 193; Plischke, “Denazification in Germany,” 214–217.

36 “Memorandum for the President, Subject: Status of the Transfer to the French Government of German Prisoners of War,” the Papers of Harry S. Truman, White House Confidential File, War Department, 1945–46, Box 35, Folder 2, 35, HSTL. U.S. numbers come from Ziemke, *U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany*, 409; Informal Policy Committee on Germany 1/4, 11 May 1945, the Papers of Harry S. Truman, Subject File, 1945–53, Foreign Affairs, Box 155, Folder 1, 22, HSTL. The U.S. government report cited is the “Report of the Interdivisional Committee on Reparation, Restitution and Property Rights,” PWC-226,

The policies commonly lauded for making the occupations of Germany and Japan a success were inconsistently applied during the initial months of occupation because security was the priority. This is not to say that the Allies did not attempt to provide aid and implement reforms to induce cooperation, but their efforts were complicated by disagreements, restrictions from Washington, and lingering fears of resistance.³⁷

Prior studies that take the post-wwii cases of Germany and Japan as models of successful military occupation generally focus on the favorable conditions and benevolent policies that accompanied the occupations when they were well established. These studies, however, do not take into account the security measures that the United States enacted during the early period of occupation. Even studies that note the priority given security during this time, as much of the historical literature does, fail to specify the rules of engagement. As a result, they cannot convey a proper understanding of what security meant in the postwar era and how U.S. occupation planners intended to deal with resistance. The analysis herein fills this gap by examining the policies designed and implemented while the probability of resistance was still believed to be high. The findings show that despite plans for democratization, American policymakers recommended sanctions and reprisals, threatened aerial bombardment, and drew lessons about effective population control from dealing with Nazi counter-insurgency.

The coercion planned and employed was in many ways a logical outgrowth of attitudes at the time. Fears that Nazi fanatics would fight to the end, along with experiences fighting in Okinawa and Iwo Jima, prompted U.S. officials to plan for the worst. Moreover, the rules of engagement, fostered by the brutality of

June 10, 1944, from *State Department Documents of the Postwar Programs Committee, 1944* (Washington, D.C., 1979), microform, Reel 3; the Soviet estimate from Department of State, *Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress, 1945-46* (Washington, D.C., 1947), 15; the U.K. and France estimates from The Council of Foreign Ministers, Moscow, "Questions Relating to Germany," March 14, 1947, the Papers of Robert F. Murphy, Box 62, HISU. For the number of POWs involved in labor reparations in the Pacific, see Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 51; for more on German labor, Bishof and Ambrose, *Eisenhower and the German POWs*, 68-70.

37 The degree to which MacArthur operated independently of Washington's policies is a matter of some debate. In his memoirs on the occupation, Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 9-10, 13, who served as Chief of the Labor Division, insists that MacArthur's reputation as a "free agent" was an "illusion."

the war, permitted such methods as hostage taking, forced labor, aerial bombing, and public execution, some of which remained in effect for weeks, months, and, in a few instances, years. In Germany, even after hostilities ceased, mass imprisonment, collective fines, curfews, restrictions on communications, prohibitions on internal movement, and compulsory labor continued. In Japan, the United States made a show of its air power to intimidate the Japanese population, and orders for martial law and direct occupation were rescinded only when American troops had become well established throughout the country. Notwithstanding the more benevolent policies that eventually followed, the priority of security sometimes led to drastic measures.

The period of draconian policy was relatively short. In Germany, strict measures began to fade in August 1945, and by mid-1946, they had mostly petered out with the fear of overt resistance. In Japan, the United States revised its coercive strategy within weeks of surrender. Yet, a focus on duration misses the point. Threats of violence need not continue indefinitely to be effective. The strategic threat of violence in the initial period of occupation could well have made a lasting impression.

That WWII occupation planners gave serious attention to matters of security may seem an obvious point, but the extent to which they emphasized security is decidedly less so. Moreover, fifty-eight years later, the notion that security measures should take priority in occupation was hardly evident when the United States planned its invasion of Iraq in 2003. Indeed, arguments that American forces would be greeted as liberators, as in Germany and Japan, encouraged the belief that strict security measures were largely unnecessary. Yet, importantly, occupation policy for Germany and Japan assumed that U.S. forces would not be greeted as liberators and, as such, made strict security measures a priority. Critics of the Iraq War point to the small number of troops initially stationed in Iraq compared to the forces that occupied Germany and Japan. The size of the force in occupied territory after WWII may be relevant, but the initial orders given to these forces must be taken into consideration as well.³⁸

38 On the lack of measures addressing security in Iraq, see Bob Woodward, *State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III* (New York, 2006), 260–261; on U.S. forces being greeted as liberators, Interview with Vice-President Dick Cheney, “NBC News’ Meet the Press,” March 16, 2003, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3080244/>.

By establishing the role of coercion in post-wwii occupation policy, this study represents a first step toward answering the question of how the post-wwii peace was won. The findings herein, however, do not suggest that coercion was primarily responsible for deterring resistance. Further research into the attitudes of the Germans and Japanese, particularly top military and political officials, is required to test this hypothesis. Nonetheless, the findings are significant. Studies that attempt to explain the peace must be based on a clear and detailed analysis of the full range of policies to avoid missing potentially relevant factors.

Equally important, the common perception of the wwii occupations as entirely peaceful operations, in both intention and outcome, has generated the assumption that successful occupations can be devoid of violence. Although nothing in this study suggests otherwise, attempts to characterize the wwii cases as evidence of successful occupations lacking coercion are without merit. The lesson to be drawn is not that coercion is necessary to deter resistance but that expectations and attitudes after wwii initially inspired a coercive policy of occupation. Indeed, when such expectations and attitudes are lacking, coercive policies may lack credibility, thus dooming any attempt to replicate the occupations of Germany and Japan.